Art. 2. Voluntary Acts
The subject is treated in the following order : 1. nature and kinds of voluntary acts ; 2. indirectly voluntary acts ; 3. obstacles to the voluntary act.
| X. Nature and Kinds of Voluntary Acts
20. Definition. A voluntary act or its effect is that which proceeds from an internal source of action accompanied by knowledge of the end sought. (St . Thomas).
Explanation. A voluntary act proceeds from an internal source of action — that is to say, from the appetitive faculty of man. Consequently a voluntary act is not to be confused with : 1. an act which man is forced to perform since this proceeds from an external cause of action ; 2. the object willed, for although the appetitive faculty tends towards this object, it does not produce it. Thus, although rain may be desired by the farmer it is not a voluntary act.
A voluntary act is accompanied by knowledge of the end sought. If the knowledge is intellectual the voluntary act is perfect ; if it is sense- knowledge the voluntary act is imperfect. Through lack of knowledge natural acts (sleeping, digesting) and spontaneous acts (“ actus primo-primi ”) are not voluntary acts.
21. Kinds. Voluntary acts are classified as follows:
1. Voluntary acts are necessary or free, according as they are produced by the will freely or necessarily. The desire for happiness and the Beatific Vision are necessary voluntary acts.
2. Voluntary acts are perfectly or imperfectly voluntary. Acts are perfectly voluntary if they proceed from perfect, intellectual knowledge ; they are imperfectly voluntary if they proceed from sense-knowledge. These latter acts are to be found also in brute animals ; thus the swallow in building its nest performs an imperfectly voluntary act.
3. Voluntary acts are absolutely or relatively voluntary, depending on the absence or presence of a certain reluctance while the act is performed ; thus to take unpleasant medicine is a relatively voluntary act.
NB. Even this relatively voluntary act is genuinely voluntary in the individual circumstances in which it is performed and therefore is a perfectly moral act. Consequently when compared with an involuntary act it is usually described as an absolutely voluntary act which is relatively involuntary. Hence in the example quoted above, an invalid taking bitter medicine performs an absolutely voluntary act which is relatively involuntary.
4. Voluntary acts are willed either directly (willed in themselves) or indirectly (willed in their cause). An act is directly voluntary if it is an immediate object of the will and desired in itself ; e.g., a thief directly intends his stealing. An act is indirectly voluntary if the will intends some object necessarily connected with an immediate object. Thus, the act of throwing cargo overboard in order to avoid shipwreck is indirectly voluntary ; it is not desired in itself but detested ; however, since it is the only means of saving life it is performed. 1
5. Voluntary acts are either positively or negatively voluntary, according as acts are performed or acts which ought to be performed are omitted.
22. SciiolIum. Involuntary acts. Distinguish carefully between involuntary acts which occur contrary to one’s intention, and those acts which are not voluntary in so far as they occur without the agent willing them. Actions which are done in concomitant ignorance are not voluntary, and yet they are not involuntary.
§ 2. Indirectly Voluntary Acts
23. Principle. It is lawful to perform an act in spite of a foreseen evil effect, provided that :
1. the act is good in itself or at least indifferent;
2. its immediate effect is good;
3. the intention of the agent is good ;
4. the agent has a proportionately grave reason for acting.
The same principle may be expressed in this way : four conditions have to be verified before the agent is permitted to allow an indirectly voluntary act which is evil : 1. the cause of the evil act is in itself good or indifferent ; 2. the immediate effect is good ; 3. the agent’s purpose is good ; 4. there exists a proportionately grave reason.
Explanation, i. First and foremost it is essential that the act which produces the evil effect be good in itself or at least indifferent. Thus one js never allowed to do acts which are themselves evil (lying, ‘The divisions of voluntary acts as given under nos. 2, 3, 4 are not explained in the same way by everyone. Therefore care must be taken to avoid confusion (blasphemy, fornication) even though an excellent result is expected to follow from them. In practice it is possible to decide whether an act is good in itself or indifferent by asking whether the agent has the right ( absolutely speaking ) to perform such an act. For example, an innkeeper has the right (absolutely speaking) to offer wine for sale ; consequently this act is good or at least indifferent even though it happens to be connected with the sin of drunkenness ; on the other hand no one has the right to kill directly an innocent person, and therefore the action of a doctor in directly procuring an abortion is intrinsically evil.
2. It is also necessary that the immediate effect of the act be good — that is to say, the evil effect must come after and not before the good effect. Let us not do evil that good may come (cf. Rom. iii, 8). This condition does not differ greatly from the first. For if the immediate effect of the act is evil, the act itself must also be evil.
3. The agent must have a good intention. Although a good intention does not justify the use of evil means, nevertheless an evil intention debases everything, including the means taken to achieve it.
4. The agent must have a proportionately grave reason for acting and permitting the evil effect, which though not intended by the agent remains a material sin and frequently engenders a grave risk of formal sin. Material sin or the danger of formal sin cannot be permitted without a proportionately grave reason. In this matter the following should be taken as the general rule :
1. The greater the evil that is indirectly willed,
2. the closer the union between the act and its evil effect,
3. the greater the certainty that the evil effect will ensue,
4. the greater the agent’s obligation by reason of his position to prevent the evil effect, so much the more serious must be his reason for permitting the evil effect.
§ 3. Obstacles to the Voluntary Act
Introductory. As will be evident from previous paragraphs, the voluntary act has two internal causes : intellectual knowledge and voluntary impulse. Therefore whatever destroys or diminishes either of these destroys or diminishes the voluntariness of man’s acts. These so-called obstacles to the voluntary act are six in number— ignorance, violence, fear, passion, habit, certain pathological states of the body. Each will be considered in turn, with the exception of ignorance about which sufficient has been said already.
1. Violence
Definition. Violence (coercion , force) is that which proceeds from some agent extrinsic to the sufferer whose will is totally opposed to it. Thus two things are required for violence : 1. an external agent, and 2. resistance on the part of the sufferer. Consequently no one can inflict violence on himself since he cannot be an external agent in reference to himself.
Principle. Violence can affect external acts only, not the internal acts of the will. If it were possible to force an internal act from the will, such an act would both proceed and not proceed from the will ; it would be voluntary in so far as it was elicited by the will, and not voluntary in so far as the violence was being resisted by the will with all its strength.
External acts, such as walking or touch, can be forced since they are performed by external organs.
Corollary. Internal acts are morally imputable no matter how much violence man has to endure ; external acts performed under the influence of violence are not imputed, provided that the individual withhold his consent internally (c. 2205).
2. Fear
Definition. Fear is defined as the shrinking of the mind from some impending or future evil. The evil which produces this state of mental fear is not yet present but is threatening or foreseen in the future and is troublesome ; present evil causes sorrow, not fear.
Kinds. Among the many classifications of fear the following seem the more important.
1. Fear is intrinsic when its cause is internal to man or is some natural agent e.g., sickness, plague, storm, etc. Fear is said to be extrinsic when its cause is a free agent distinct from the sufferer, e.g., another human being, the devil. Some authors prefer to regard all fear as extrinsic, even when it results from natural causes, such as fear caused by a storm.
2. Fear is grave or slight, according as the impending danger is grave or slight. Grave fear requires the presence of an evil which is grave, closely imminent, and difficult to avoid. If only one of these conditions is not verified, the fear is said to be slight. Grave fear is either absolutely grave, viz. grave for all men, or relatively grave, grave for a certain individual. Reverential fear in a subject who stands in fear of the displeasure and anger of his superior is usually regarded as slight fear. However, if the subject feared the infliction of grave punishment as the result of his superior’s displeasure this reverential fear could become grave.
3. Fear is just if it is inflicted in a fitting manner by a person with lawful authority ; otherwise it is unjust.
4. Antecedent fear is that which exists prior to an act and causes it. Concomitant fear is that which accompanies an act and far from causing it would rather prevent it, if this were possible. Through antecedent fear the traveller hands over his money to the highwayman, who accepts the money in concomitant fear since he is afraid of being captured and punished.
The Influence of Fear on Human Acts
First Principle. Fear which is not sufficiently grave to deprive a person of the use of his reason diminishes but does not destroy the voluntariness of his acts.
Fear which deprives a person of the use of his reason clearly destroys the voluntariness of any act performed under its influence ; no other form of fear has the same effect since the two causes of a voluntary act– knowledge and free will — are unimpaired. However the act is less voluntary since it would not be performed if the fear were absent.
Second Principle. Grave fear or, as is commonly said, grave inconvenience excuse a man from compliance with positive law ( whether human or divine).
The reason is that legislators are presumed to be unwilling to oblige their subjects to comply with these laws in such great difficulties. Sometimes, however, even grave inconvenience does not excuse a man from complying with positive law, when the common good or the interests of religion would otherwise be endangered ; thus, for example, a soldier must remain at his post even though he fears death.
Third Principle, a) The unjust use of grave fear does not of itself invalidate contracts made under its influence ; b) such contracts can be rescinded, c) However positive law declares that certain contracts (or acts) made under the influence of grave fear arc of their nature invalid (cl. c. 103)
§4 The reason for the first part of the principle is that since fear docs not vitiate a voluntary act, it does not prevent the consent necessary for the validity of a contract.
With regard to the second part it is evident that a person who makes a contract while under the influence of grave fear unjustly inflicted is suffering an injury from which he is free to escape by rescission of the contract (c. 1684).
For sufficient reasons certain contracts or acts resulting from the unjust infliction of grave fear are rendered invalid by positive law, such as entrance or admission into a noviciate, religious profession, betrothal, marriage, vows, election ofa prelate, absolution from censures, renunciation of benefices and ecclesiastical offices.
3 . Passion or Concupiscence
Definition and Kinds. Among the many meanings given to the term “ passion ” those to be found in the works of Aristotle and Plato are outstanding.
According to Aristotle passion is a movement in the sense appetite caused by the imaginative awareness of the presence of good or evil and productive of some change in the body.
Aristotle speaks of a movement, viz. some action or operation. It is a movement in the sense appetite, because neither the intellect nor the will but the sense appetite (cither the concupiscible or the irascible appetite) elicits these acts. This movement is caused by the imaginative awareness of good or evil, since passions are produced by the imagination’s vivid realisation of the presence of good or evil. Passions produce some change in the body since they have a strong reaction on the bodily organism — for example, by increasing the heart-beat, by making the face flushed or pale, etc.
Passions in the Aristotelian sense of the word are entirely sense operations, neither good nor bad, and are to be found in every man, even in Christ Himself.
According to Plato, the Stoics, and many modern writers the passions are inordinate acts or habits of the sense appetite. They are therefore regarded as diseases of the mind and incline man towards sin. It would be preferable to call such passions vices.
Concupiscence may be understood in one of three ways : 1. as identical with the passions in general ; 2. as one form of passion, namely desire ; 3. as an evil inclination of the lower or higher appetite in man vitiated by original sin.
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguished eleven different kinds of passion in man — six belonging to the concupiscible appetite, five to the irascible appetite : in the concupisciblc appetite in reference to good in reference to evil; love hatred; desire aversion; joy sorrow; in the irascible appetite in reference to good in reference to evil; hope courage; despair fear; anger
The Influence of the Passions on Voluntary Acts
Introductory. The passions may exist before or after the operation of the will and intellect. Antecedent passion arises from causes that are independent of the human will, v.g., from the state of the body, from a sudden and unexpected disturbance. Consequent passion is caused in one of two ways : either the desire of the will for some object is so strong that it excites corresponding movements in the sense appetite, or the will may deliberately decide to excite within man some passion which it uses in order to act more promptly and vigorously.
First Principle. Antecedent passion diminishes the voluntariness of acts performed under its influence ; if it is sufficiently violent to prevent the use of reason, the acts are completely involuntary.
The reason for the first part of the principle is that this form of passion clouds the human intellect to some extent and provides a powerful impulse towards the act — as is evident, for example, in those acts committed as the result of the inordinate passions of anger, love, etc. Sins committed under the influence of antecedent passion are called sins of human frailty. The second part of the principle is self-evident.
Second Principle. Consequent passion which is deliberately fostered by the will increases the voluntary character of any act performed under its influence ; consequent passion which results from the vehemence of the will’s desire for some object does not increase the voluntariness of an act but is a sign of greater power in the will.
In reference to the first part of the principle it must be noted that a man who acts as the result of such passion not only wills the act perfectly but also encourages the sense appetite to help it in its action through means of some passion.
With regard to the second part of the principle, if the will has sufficient strength not merely to move the soul but also to overflow into the sense appetite, evidently it must be extremely powerful.
Scholium. The influence of habit on a voluntary act. What has been said about the influence of the passions on a voluntary act is almost equally applicable to the influence of human habits. A habit is nothing more than a constant inclination produced by repeated acts towards the performance of similar acts. A voluntary habit, viz., one which is not deliberately checked, increases voluntariness since it is a most effective help for the performance of an act ; it has the same influence on a voluntary act as any consequent passion which is deliberately fostered by the will. An involuntary habit either diminishes or destroys voluntariness, for it exerts the same influence on an act as antecedent passion.
Certain Pathological States of the Body
Introductory. Certain morbid conditions of the body diminish or even destroy knowledge and volition. Here we shall not discuss complete insanity, but only so-called “ fixed ideas ” and hysteria which exercise a powerful influence on human acts.
Fixed or compulsory ideas (phobias) inflict severe torment on many individuals and may centre on an almost indefinite number of objects. Their origin is still completely unknown. Such fixed ideas greatly diminish the voluntariness of acts performed under their influence so that their victims are almost incapable of committing mortal sin. At most there may be venial sin, often there is no sin at all. There is no more effective weapon against such fixed ideas than (apart from prudent care for bodily health) strict obedience to a confessor or director who is prudent, firm and — above all — patient.
Hysteria is a special form of nervous disease to be found more frequently in women, although it is sometimes rife in men. The exact nature of this disease is not yet known, although it seems to be a morbid state of autosuggestion. It is of the first importance to remember that this disease is in no way a cause for reproach and that it does not always arise from lust. Consequently it sometimes happens that even the most pious people suffer from this disease. The confessor must exercise extreme care and prudence in dealing with such persons, otherwise both he and they may easily suffer great harm.
Characteristic signs or symptoms of hysteria:
a) an exaggerated and unhealthy form of egotism ;
b) excessive fickleness in the emotions (of happiness and sorrow, love and hatred);
c) lack of truth (systematic lying born of a deluded imagination). Hysterics are liars who are not always conscious of their lies.
d) sins against the virtue of temperance (excessive drinking or impurity).
Morality of the actions of hysterics. Although hysteria greatly diminishes voluntariness, normally it does not destroy it. Therefore hysterics cannot be excused from all blame for their evil acts ; sometimes, however, their sins are not mortal, even if contrary to the Sixth Commandment. Therefore the confessor must be extremely prudent and cautious in judging their actions.
Cure for hysteria. In addition to bodily treatment hysterics must show perfect obedience towards their confessor or director, and attack with all their strength their abnormal egotism by performing works of charity and by ceasing to think too much about themselves.