TREATISE IV
Conscience
This subject will be considered under the following headings : 1 . definition and kinds of conscience ; 2. the true conscience and the false conscience ; 3. the lax conscience ; 4. the perplexed conscience and the scrupulous conscience ; 5. the certain conscience and the doubting conscience ; 6. various moral systems ; 7. the education of conscience.
CHAPTER I. DEFINITION AND KINDS OF CONSCIENCE
135. Definition. Leaving on one side other meanings of the word, conscience is here understood for the judgement or dictate of the practical intellect deciding front general principles the goodness or evil of some act which is to be done here and now or has been done in the past.
1. Conscience is a judgement or dictate of the practical intellect, since it is not a power or a habit but an act, viz., the application of knowledge to an individual fact, and this application is a judgement or dictate of the practical intellect. Therefore conscience is not an act of the speculative intellect or of the will.
2. Conscience derives its judgement from general principles, since it presupposes as true the general principles of faith and of natural reason, and applies these to an individual case. Therefore conscience does not pass judgement on the truths of faith and of reason but decides whether the act to be done (or which has been done) is in conformity with existing just law.
3. Conscience decides the goodness or evil of some act which is to be done here and now (or has been done). Conscience is the subjective standard of morality and therefore an act is subjectively good or bad according to the judgement of conscience. The proper and primary function of conscience is to pass judgement on an act which is to be done, but it may also pass judgement on acts which have been performed already.
136. Scholium. Difference between conscience, moral habIt (SYNDERESIS), MORAL SCIENCE, PRUDENCE, NATURAL LAW.
1. Moral habit (syndcresis) is the habitual practical knowledge of the first principles whose proper act is to decide in a general way that good must be done and evil avoided, whereas conscience decides in an individual case what is to be done or omitted. The moral habit of man never errs, conscience may do so.
2. Moral science deduces objective conclusions from the first principles, whereas conscience is something subjective which may or may not agree with moral science.
3. Prudence is a virtue and therefore a habit ; conscience on the other hand is an act. Sometimes, however, an act of prudence coincides with conscience.
4. Natural law embraces the objective principles of morality, whereas conscience uses these principles to decide whether an act should be performed or whether it should be omitted.
137. Kinds, i. In regard to the act considered by conscience, conscience is either antecedent if it precedes the act to be performed, or consequent if it passes judgement on acts already performed. Antecedent conscience either commands or forbids or counsels or permits the performance of an act ; consequent conscience either approves of the act performed, causing spiritual joy, or disapproves of the act, thus causing remorse.
2. In regard to its conformity with the eternal law conscience is true (correct) when it deduces correctly from true principles that some act is lawful ; it is false (erroneous) when it decides from false principles considered as true that something is lawful which in fact is unlawful. An erroneous conscience is further distinguished into : a) a scrupulous conscience which for useless and almost ridiculous reasons judges or, rather, fears that an act is evil when in fact it is not ; b) a perplexed conscience which sees sin both in the performance and in the omission of some act ; c) a lax conscience which judges on insufficient grounds that there is no sin in the act, or that the sin is not so grave as it is in fact ; the worst form of this type of conscience is the hardened conscience which as the result of a long-established habit of sinning regards all — or at least some — sins to be of little importance ; d) a pharisaic conscience which minimises grave sins but magnifies matters of little importance in the same way as the Pharisees behaved.
3. In regard to the act of assent, conscience is either certain when without any prudent fear of error it firmly decides that some act is either lawful or unlawful, or probable when it judges that some act is probably lawful of one’s country. It is simply one form of a personal tax. It may happen incidentally that this law ceases to oblige, a) if it is unjust, such as when exempt clerics are forced to fight with arms, b) if soldiers arc forced to fight in a war that is manifestly unjust. There is a sufficiently common opinion amongst modern theologians that the civil law regarding military service is binding in legal justice. But there are three cases when this law binds in commutative justice : r. if anyone freely and by contract enlists in the fighting services ; 2. if a person by deceitful evasion of his service has been the cause of another designated citizen being compelled to fight ; 3. if he offers money to doctors or other officials to bribe them into declaring him unfit for military service.
TREATISE IV
Conscience
This subject will be considered under the following headings : I. definition and kinds of conscience ; 2. the true conscience and the false conscience ; 3. the lax conscience ; 4. the perplexed conscience and the scrupulous conscience ; 5. the certain conscience and the doubting conscience ; 6. various moral systems ; 7. the education of conscience.
CHAPTER I. DEFINITION AND KINDS OF CONSCIENCE
135. Definition. Leaving 011 one side other meanings of the word, conscience is here understood for the judgement or dictate of the practical intellect deciding from general principles the goodness or evil of some act which is to be done here and now or has been done in the past.
1. Conscience is a judgement or dictate of the practical intellect , since it is not a power or a habit but an act , viz., the application of knowledge to an individual fact, and this application is a judgement or dictate of the practical intellect. Therefore conscience is not an act of the speculative intellect or of the will.
2. Conscience derives its judgement from general principles, since it presupposes as true the general principles of faith and of natural reason, and applies these to an individual case. Therefore conscience does not pass judgement on the truths of faith and of reason but decides whether the act to be done (or which has been done) is in conformity with existing just law.
3. Conscience decides the goodness or evil of some act which is to be done here and now ( or has been done). Conscience is the subjective standard of morality and therefore an act is subjectively good or bad according to the judgement of conscience. The proper and primary function of conscience is to pass judgement on an act which is to be done, but it may also pass judgement on acts which have been performed already.
136. Scholium. Difference between conscience, moral habit (SYNDERESIS), MORAL SCIENCE, PRUDENCE, NATURAL LAW.
1. Moral habit (syndcresis) is the habitual practical knowledge of the first principles whose proper act is to decide in a general way that good must be done and evil avoided, whereas conscience decides in an individual case what is to be done or omitted. The moral habit of man never errs, conscience may do so.
2. Moral science deduces objective conclusions from the first principles, whereas conscience is something subjective which may or may not agree with moral science.
3. Prudence is a virtue and therefore a habit; conscience on the other hand is an act. Sometimes, however, an act of prudence coincides with conscience.
4. Natural law embraces the objective principles of morality, whereas conscience uses these principles to decide whether an act should be performed or whether it should be omitted.
137. Kinds, i. In regard to the act considered by conscience, conscience is either antecedent if it precedes the act to be performed, or consequent if it passes judgement on acts already performed. Antecedent conscience either commands or forbids or counsels or permits the performance of an act ; consequent conscience either approves of the act performed, causing spiritual joy, or disapproves of the act, thus causing remorse.
2. In regard to its conformity with the eternal law conscience is true (correct) when it deduces correctly from true principles that some act is lawful ; it is false (erroneous) when it decides from false principles considered as true that something is lawful which in fact is unlawful. An erroneous conscience is further distinguished into : a) a scrupulous conscience which for useless and almost ridiculous reasons judges or, rather, fears that an act is evil when in fact it is not ; b) a perplexed conscience which sees sin both in the performance and in the omission of some act ; c) a lax conscience which judges on insufficient grounds that there is no sin in the act, or that the sin is not so grave as it is in fact ; the worst form of this type of conscience is the hardened conscience which as the result of a long-established habit of sinning regards all — or at least some — sins to be of little importance ; d) a pharisaic conscience which minimises grave sins but magnifies matters of little importance in the same way as the Pharisees behaved.
3. In regard to the act of assent, conscience is either certain when without any prudent fear of error it firmly decides that some act is either lawful or unlawful, or probable when it judges that some act is probably lawful or unlawful, or doubting when it hesitates to pass judgement on the moral character of the act.
A doubting conscience understood in this latter sense is really a contradiction in terms. Conscience is defined as essentially a judgement or dicta e of the intellect, whereas doubt signifies a suspension or denial of judgement. Therefore, it would be preferable to cease speaking of a doubting conscience and to substitute the resolution of moral doubt. Some modern authors identify a doubting conscience with a probable conscience.
CHAPTER II. THE TRUE CONSCIENCE AND THE FALSE CONSCIENCE
138. First Principle. Everyone is obliged to use serious care to possess on all occasions a true conscience.
The reason is obvious : conscience is the proximate norm of morality which must act as the guide for the whole of man’s moral life. Now it is of supreme importance that his moral life be guided by a correct and not by a false standard. — The means to be used for obtaining a true conscience are : a) a careful knowledge of the laws which govern our moral life ; b ) taking wise counsel ; c) prayer to the Father of light ; d) removal of obstacles to a true conscience, chief amongst which is the obscurity resulting from unforgiven sin.
139. Second Principle. Everyone is obliged to follow his conscience whether it commands or forbids some action, not only when it is true but also when it is in invincible error.
There is a reason for the use of the two words “ commands ” and “forbids,” for if conscience permits or merely counsels some line of action there is no strict obligation to follow it. It is patently obvious why we must obey a true conscience, and the reason for man’s obligation to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience is that failure to do so would mean that he was acting contrary to the subjective norm of morality and was therefore committing sin. Thus, for example, a person who is convinced that he ought to tell a lie in order to save his friend from some danger is bound to tell the lie ; in so doing he does not commit formal sin. Anyone who thinks that to-day is a fast-day, although as a matter of fact it is not, and in spite of his conviction docs not observe the fast commits formal sin.
140. Third Principle. It is not permissible to follow conscience when it is in vincible error no matter whether it commands or forbids some action ; on the other hand one cannot act contrary to such a conscience ; the error must be corrected before any action is taken.
As will be proved later, a certain conscience alone is the lawful guide of morality. A vincibly erroneous conscience is not a certain conscious and consequently a man who acts while his conscience is in that state exposes himself to the danger of sin.— -If a man’s conscience is in error through his own fault, then he must correct that error by taking suitable means to discover the truth ; if his efforts fail lie must refrain from action, but if even this is impossible then he must choose what appears to be the safer course.
CHAPTER III. THE LAX CONSCIENCE
141. The causes of a lax conscience are numerous : 1. bad education and evil company — all too evident from daily experience ; 2. violent disorderly passions which usually cloud the intellect and prevent it from making a correct judgement ; 3. a life of vice which causes spiritual blindness or at least shortsightedness.
142. The remedies for a lax conscience are : 1. devout and assiduous prayer to God, the Father of light ; 2. sacramental confession where the penitent receives grace and correct instruction ; 3. removal of the causes of laxity.
CHAPTER IV. THE PERPLEXED CONSCIENCE AND THE SCRUPULOUS CONSCIENCE
143. i. A perplexed conscience is one which fears sin both in the performance and in the omission of some action. For example, a sensitive person whose duty it is to care for a sick person thinks that it is sinful not to assist at Mass on a Feast day, and yet fears that he sins against charity by leaving the sick person alone in the house.
Rule to be followed. If the person suffering from a perplexed conscience is able to suspend action or to seek advice, then that without doubt is the course to be followed ; if on the other hand this is morally impossible, then he should choose that which seems to him the less of two evils ; if he is not able to decide which is the less evil, he is free to decide either to act or to refrain from action since no one is obliged by the impossible and no one commits sin when under the influence of force.
If the state of perplexity arises through previous negligence, v.g., if a confessor through culpable lack of knowledge does not know whether to absolve a penitent or not, what has been said already in n. 17 in reference to vincible and culpable ignorance applies here.
144. 2. A scrupulous conscience is a state of groundless fear rather than the judgement of a healthy mind. Such a conscience is a torment both to the penitent and to the confessor. Great care must be exercised in distinguishing it from a tender conscience which carefully avoids all sin, even the smallest. Therefore it is essential to be familiar with the signs of a scrupulous conscience.
Signs of a scrupulous conscience : a) excessive anxiety about previous confessions ; b ) protracted accusations of irrelevant details ; c ) stubbornness which refuses to accept the decisions of the confessor.
The causes of a scrupulous conscience are sometimes (although rarely) supernatural, viz. God or the devil ; more frequently they are natural and are either moral, such as the excessive avoidance of human company, conversation with timorous persons, hidden pride, etc., or physical, viz. a pathological condition of the brain or heart or nerves or intestines.
The remedies for scruples are : a) the removal of their causes, for which the aid of an experienced doctor is often necessary ; b) perfect obedience to a wise director ; c) healthy recreation and manual or spiritual work to distract the mind from the scrupulous thoughts ; d) fervent and assiduous prayer to God, the Father of light and the source of peace.
CHAPTER V. THE CERTAIN CONSCIENCE AND THE DOUBTING CONSCIENCE
We shall consider : i. the certain conscience ; 2. the doubting conscience, or rather, the course of action to be followed in a state of moral doubt.
Art. x. The Certain Conscience
145. Kinds. As stated already, a certain conscience judges without any prudent fear of error that an act is either lawful or unlawful.
Moral certainty — and this is the type of certainty to be considered here — is divided as follows :
a) it is said to he perfect ( strict ) when it excludes prudent doubt, and imperfect (wide) when some slight reasons militate against the truth of a decision which is founded on serious motives.
b) Moral certainty is speculative when the intellect considers the truth of some matter in an objective manner without any direct reference to a practical case ; it is practical when it is concerned with an act to be done here and now.
c) Direct moral certainty is based on intrinsic principles which clearly reveal the moral character of the act ; indirect moral certainty is derived from what are called reflex principles, which we shall discuss later.
146. Principle, a) Only a certain conscience ( whether the certainty is direct or indirect ) is a comet guide to moral behaviour, and b) to act lawfully imperfect certainty is ordinarily sufficient.
The reason for the first part of the principle is that the man who acts without being morally certain that his act is lawful commits sin by exposing himself unnecessarily to the proximate danger of formally offending God.
The second part rests on the fact that sometimes it is impossible to obtain anything more than imperfect certainty regarding our actions, and no one is bound to do the impossible. The same truth is evident from the third proposition condemned by Alexander VIII : “ It is unlawful to follow even the most probable amongst probable opinions.” Even the most probable opinion is not absolutely certain but is certain only in the wide sense of the term. Therefore if one is permitted to follow a most probable opinion, absolute certainty is not always required, and certainty in the wide sense is sufficient.
Art. 2. The Doubting Conscience, or, Moral Doubt.
147. Kinds. Doubt understood in the strict sense is the suspension of the intellect’s assent and judgement in reference to a proposition, and consequently it is opposed not only to certainty but also to suspicion and opinion in which there exists a genuine intellectual assent, although imperfect and accompanied by the fear of error. When in doubt the mind is like the arm of a balance which remains horizontal inclining neither to one side nor to the other. — Together with St. Thomas earlier authors used to distinguish three steps leading to the firm assent of the intellect : 1. the state of doubt where no assent exists ; 2. the states of opinion and suspicion in which the intellect gives an imperfect assent ; 3. science and faith where there exists a firm assent, without any fear of error. — Recent authors usually prefer to speak of only two stages, viz., a certain assent without any fear of error (certainty) and uncertain assent accompanied by the fear of error (doubt).
Kinds of doubt, i. The mind may be doubtful about the existence of some law (dubium iuris) or of some particular fact (dubium facti).
2. Doubt is said to be positive when the fear of error is based on grave reasons ; it is negative when the fear of error rests on slight reasons.
3. Doubt is either speculative or practical. The first turns on the objective morality of a human act irrespective of its present performance or omission. Such speculative doubt exists in controversial questions when moralists argue on either side, v.g., whether an irregular will binds in conscience or not. Practical doubt is concerned with the morality of an act about to be performed here and now — for example, whether it is lawful to read this dangerous book.
148. Principle. No one is allowed to perform an act while in a state of positive practical doubt.
The reason should be evident from what has been said already. For if certainty in the wide sense of the word is required for lawful action it is not lawful to act while in a state of positive practical doubt, since by so doing one exposes oneself to the immediate danger of committing formal sin. If, therefore, a man doubts the lawfulness of some action he must either refrain from acting or remove his practical doubt. There are two possible ways of removing the doubt, one direct, the other indirect. The direct method consists in diligently searching after the truth until at length certainty is attained. If this direct method is impossible, then the doubt may be removed indirectly by so-called reflex principles.
149. Reflex or indirect principles are general directions which directly and of themselves do not prove the truth of the matter under investigation but nevertheless reflect, so to speak, their own clear light on the obscure practical doubt and dispel the darkness of that doubt while the act is being performed. The more important reflex principles are the following :
1. A doubtful law has no binding force.
2. In doubt one must stand by presumption.
3. In doubt possession is nine-tenths of the law.
4. A doubtful law has no binding force whenever the doubt concerns the lawfulness of an act and not its validity. Whatever may be said about the truth of this principle which is fiercely attacked by some theologians, all modem theologians arc agreed that it cannot be applied in the following cases :
a) when the doubt concerns the validity of the Sacraments ; b) when the doubt concerns something which is absolutely necessary for salvation; so, for example, when there is risk of losing eternal life, the safer opinion must be followed ; c) when the question involves an established right of a third party. Thus, for example, a judge would not be justified in giving judgement on the basis of a probable opinion while refusing to follow what is certainly the more probable opinion.
2. When in doubt one must stand by presumption. This seems the most useful of all the principles and was already to be found expressed in the Decretals of Gregory IX. All other reflex principles rest on this and when rightly used it seems sufficient for solving all practical doubt.
3. In doubt possession is nine-tenths of the law. This principle forms the basis for the theory of Equiprobabilism and is known in brief as the principle of possession. In its application to matters of commutative justice the principle is most certain and is found in the Decretals of Gregory IX, but it has also been extended to other matters, although its practical application is not devoid of difficulty and is frequently misused.
CHAPTER VI. VARIOUS MORAL SYSTEMS
150. Definition. A moral system is a method of arriving at moral certainty from a state of practical doubt. There are seven such systems : —
1. Rigorism, or Absolute Tutiorism, maintains that the safer course must always be followed even though the opinion in favour of liberty is most probable. This was the opinion of Joannes Sinnichius, Doctor of Louvain (d. 1666) and of the Jansenists. The system was condemned by Alexander VIII who censured the following proposition on Dec. 7, 1690 : “ It is not lawful to follow even the most probable of probable opinions.”
151. 2. Moderate Tutiorism teaches that the less safe opinion which favours liberty can be followed provided that it is most probable. This was the system proposed by certain doctors at Louvain (Steyart, Opstraet) and by other authors, v.g., Henry of St. Ignatius, Gerdil. Although this system has not been condemned by the Church, nowadays it is rightly rejected by everyone as too severe and impossible to follow in practice.
152. 3. Probabiliorism asserts that one may follow the opinion that favours liberty so long as it is clearly more probable than the opinion in favour of the law. Before the days of Medina this system was the one most commonly taught but today it finds few supporters owing to its great practical difficulties.
153. 4. Equiprobabilism is summed up in the following statement : “ when there are conflicting opinions which are equally or almost equally probable, it is lawful to follow the opinion in favour of liberty when the doubt relates to the existence of law, but if the doubt concerns the cessation of law, the law continues to bind.” (cf. Aertneys C.SS.R.) To some extent this system resembles the previous system of Probabiliorism, in so far as it maintains that it is permissible to follow the opinion in favour of liberty when it is certainly more probable, but he must follow the opinion in favour of the law if this is certainly more probable. The principal exponent of this system is St. Alphonsus who was preceded by Eusebius Amort, Rassler and others; all Redemptorists and many others follow the same view.
154. 5. Pure Probabilism maintains that in cases of doubt relating to the lawfulness of acts and not to their validity it is always lawful to follow the opinion in favour of liberty if the opinion is certainly probable, even though the opinion in favour of the law is much more probable.
There are various kinds of probability.
1) Probability is either intrinsic or extrinsic. Probability is said to be intrinsic when it is founded on reasons taken from the nature of the matter to prove its truth ; it is extrinsic when based on the authority of learned men. An opinion is considered to be extrinsically probable when there are five or six noteworthy authorities in its favour or at least one outstanding doctor like St. Thomas or St. Alphonsus.
2) An opinion may be either certainly, or doubtfully, or slightly probable, according as the opinion rests on solid and firm arguments, or on doubtful or slight arguments.
3) Probability is absolute when the arguments in favour of an opinion considered by themselves, viz., independently of any opposing arguments, appear to be valid ; probability is relative if the arguments in favour of an opinion retain their value only when compared with the arguments supporting the contrary opinion. The first theologian to lend his support to this theory was Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who has been followed by an almost innumerable number of theologians down to the present day.
155. 6 . Lax Probabiljsm or Laxism taught that it is lawful to follow an opinion that is not only certainly probable— as Probabilism maintains —but even when the opinion is doubtfully or slightly probable. This was the teaching of Thomas Tamburinus, Caramuel, Bauny, Moya and others. Nowadays this theory has ceased to exist and seems to have been condemned by Innocent IX in proscribing this third proposition: “Generally, in doing anything that is supported by intrinsic or extrinsic probability no matter how slight, provided it does not cease to be probable, we are acting prudently.”
156. 7. COMPENSATIONISM Or THE SYSTEM OF SUFFICIENT CAUSE maintains that one may follow a certainly probable opinion in favour of liberty while abandoning a more probable opinion in favour of the law, but when there is danger of sin there is required a sufficient reason (compensation) for acting in favour of liberty. If this sufficient reason is lacking, one must follow the more probable opinion. Tins opinion is held by Potton, Manier, Laloux and other more recent authors.
Practical Conclusion. Apart from Rigorism and Laxism each of the above systems is tolerated by the Church, and in consequence the confessor is not entitled to force his own system on the penitent or to demand something from his penitent to which the latter is not obliged according to the principles of one or other of the systems. Therefore the confessor may prudently advise the safer and more probable opinion, but he is not justified in imposing such on the penitent. In practice let him choose those opinions which, taking everything into consideration, promise to be the more beneficial for the spiritual welfare of his penitent.
CHAPTER VII. THE EDUCATION OP CONSCIENCE
157. It is of the utmost importance that the conscience of man be free from error and embrace the truth. For it is a true conscience that bears the best fruit, and nothing but the most grievous harm can result from a false conscience. The education of conscience has a vital part to play in enabling man to avoid error, and there are both natural and supernatural means to be used to achieve this purpose.
The natural means are : a) a good education from the beginning of childhood : b ) a perfect sincerity in man with himself by a faithful, continual and candid examination of his own conscience.
The supernatural means are : a) fervent prayer to God, the Father of light ; b ) a strenuous fight against man’s disordered passions with the aid of divine grace ; c) sacramental confession and obedience to one’s spiritual director.